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Abstract In an article printed last year in International Organization, Keohane,
Macedo, and Moravcsik argued that multilateral organizations ~MLO! could actually
be good for democracy+ We argue that KMM discount the prospect that MLO influ-
ence can be detrimental to democracies not because MLOs are “distant, elitist, and
technocratic” but precisely because MLOs are highly political+ International organi-
zations have much to offer in improving the welfare of citizens and facilitating coor-
dinations among states+ They are not likely to improve procedural functions of
democracies without a cost that itself is problematic for democracy+
In a recent article in this journal, Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik ~KMM!1 take
issue with the conventional wisdom that multilateral organizations ~MLOs! are
antidemocratic+ A number of observers voice reservations about the growing capac-
ity of international institutions to affect domestic politics+ Specifically, MLOs have
been accused of interfering with majoritarian democratic preferences+ While KMM
acknowledge that intervention weakens democratic representation, they argue that
constitutional democracy consists of other functions such as deliberation and pro-
tection of minority rights+ Multilateralism can produce other “democracy-enhancing
constitutional functions,” KMM argue, making democracy more democratic+2
We welcome KMM’s provocative insight and agree that multilateralism need
not be “distant, elitist, and technocratic+”3 However, KMM discount the prospect
that MLO influence can be detrimental to democracies precisely because MLOs
are highly political+ Politicized MLOs present one of two key risks to the func-
tioning of democracies, as they either: ~1! weaken popular rule and empower spe-
cial interests that consequently undermine majoritarian preferences, or ~2! further
empower the strong and disempower the weak, thus magnifying the politicization
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in domestic politics that KMM point to as a justification for MLO intervention+
While MLOs are capable of protecting minorities and combating special interests
as KMM emphasize, they are much more likely to do the opposite, weakening
democracy or magnifying patterns of politicization already prevalent in domestic
politics+ Advancing MLOs as a blanket remedy for domestic tyranny without
addressing these risks, as KMM do, is unbalanced+
The validity of KMM’s argument hinges on three assumptions or value judg-
ments about: ~1! what makes democracy democratic, ~2! the decision-making
process of MLOs versus domestic governments, and ~3! public goods versus dis-
tributional effects of MLOs+ The first assumption concerns the relative impor-
tance of various components of democracy, such as representation, deliberation,
and the protection of minority rights+ The second assumption concerns an expec-
tation that domestic politics is subject to capture by special interests, while inter-
national politics is substantially sheltered from the influence of special interests+
The third assumption involves the view that MLOs largely affect the provision of
public goods, but that they do not much affect the distribution of private benefits+
We take issue with each point below+
What Makes Democracy Democratic?: Conflating
Procedure and Outcome
KMM do not dispute that MLO intervention makes democracy less representa-
tive+4 Instead, their argument hinges on discounting the importance of repre-
sentation in favor of other social benefits that they argue can be generated by MLOs+
This is problematic, however, since representation is the defining and necessary
attribute of democracy+5 Representation is not, as KMM argue, “only one among a
number of political values to be balanced in a well-ordered constitutional democ-
racy,” since without representation democracy ceases to be democratic+6
Initiatives that erode representation should be held to a high standard in dem-
onstrating that benefits outweigh the undisputed costs+ Rather than simply provid-
ing examples where such welfare benefits may exist, KMM need to show first that
limiting representation is necessary to improve citizens’ welfare—that desired social
benefits cannot be achieved through other means—and second, that these benefits
outweigh the costs incurred by limiting representation+
As to our first point, KMM’s claims rest heavily on the effects of MLOs in
enhancing features that are common, but not unique or necessary components of
procedural democracy, such as the rule of law, insulation and delegation, and pro-
4+ MLOs and other groups also seek to improve representation through election monitoring, etc+
5+ See Dahl 1971 and 1989; Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999; and Przeworski et al+ 2000+
6+ Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009, 5+
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tection of minority interests+7 Their claims about “democracy-enhancing” multi-
lateralism involve the effects of improvements in domestic political processes and
policy outcomes writ large, not on democratic procedure per se+
KMM also conflate democratic procedures with general welfare outcomes+8 While
eventually acknowledging that “merely demonstrating multilateralism leads to more
effective governance does not constitute evidence for our argument,”9 KMM repeat-
edly make the inference that since: ~1! democracy makes government and0or soci-
ety better, and ~2! multilateralism makes government and0or society better, that
~3! multilateralism makes democracy better+ The third point does not logically fol-
low from the first two, however, as what makes democracy distinct from other
forms of government is the procedural emphasis on responding to the popular will+
This procedural emphasis itself, as comparative studies of younger democracies
have shown, does not necessarily produce good governance or improvements in
social welfare+10
Nor is it clear that MLOs are necessary to achieve the social benefits KMM
advocate ~second point!+ National governments or nonstate actors, such as non-
governmental organizations ~NGOs!, can also assist or intervene in domestic
national affairs to reduce the scope of special interest politics, improve public goods
provisions, or protect minority rights+ If there is nothing the authors identify that
uniquely qualifies MLOs to provide these services, then we must question whether
MLOs as institutions are best suited to address the tasks that KMM advocate+
Democracy promotion, for instance, is a pillar of U+S+ foreign policy+ Similarly,
MNCs can be credited with curbing entrenched local interests, promoting minor-
ity rights ~property rights!, and the rule of law+11 Government and nongovernmen-
tal actors also have various means to improve public goods provisions, even in the
face of strong opposition by local special interests+ A voluminous literature in com-
parative politics has shown that democratic governments can achieve improve-
ments through internal political and economic reforms12 and through increasing
transparency+13 Autocratic governments can also improve public goods provision
by expanding representation, allowing protest, and through the use of grassroots
organizations+14 Thus, MLO activities are not necessary for improved public goods
provision+
Nor do KMM make clear why multilateralism is necessarily superior to inter-
ventions by bilateral or unilateral organizations+ Goldstein has shown that trade
liberalization was achieved through unilateral and bilateral agreements under Brit-
7+ See Haggard and Moon 1990; Przeworski and Limongi 1993; and Bueno de Mesquita et al+
2003+
8+ We thank an anonymous reviewer for guiding us to this direction+
9+ Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009, 25+
10+ See Keefer 2007; and Lake and Baum 2001+
11+ Malesky 2008+
12+ See Rogowski 1987; Persson and Tebellini 2003; and Haggard and Kaufman 1995+
13+ Rose-Ackerman 1999+
14+ See Bueno de Mesquita et al+ 2003; Gandhi 2008; and Tsai 2007+
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ish hegemony, while it has been pursued multilaterally under U+S+ hegemony+15
KMM themselves accept that the use of both “bilateral and multilateral forums to
negotiate trade liberalization” allowed governments to build broader coalitions for
free trade+16 Postwar occupations of Japan ~bilateral! and Germany ~multilateral!
were equally successful at promoting democracy+ In sum, MLOs do not appear to
be necessary to accomplish the objectives set out by KMM+
As for our second point, the authors seem to believe that the will of the
population is just one of several elements to be “weighted” in a cost-benefit analy-
sis of MLO influence+ However, external supervision also creates the possibility
that democracy will be degraded rather than improved ~see studies of multilateral
peace-keeping and democratization!+ Broadening the role of MLOs in domestic
politics necessarily involves the risk of making democracies less representative,
something that KMM do not directly dispute+ While KMM outline other objec-
tives that have social value, they fail to clarify how these tradeoffs are to be
evaluated+
Decision-Making Processes of MLOs Versus Domestic
Governments
KMM argue that MLOs can help to counter special interest politics at the domes-
tic level+ The benefit envisioned by KMM again requires a particular sort of polit-
ical world, one in which a domestic polity is captured by special interests, while
MLOs remain largely apolitical+ Yet, a growing international politics of special
interests is already a discernible companion to expanding MLO influence+ MLOs
must do a better job of protecting minorities and resisting special interests than
domestic institutions, given the loss of representation, greater physical and politi-
cal distance, asymmetric information, bureaucratic hurdles, and problems of col-
lective action+ While KMM acknowledge the possibility that special interests
influence MLO decision making, they quickly dismiss these influences+17
Special interests that have co-opted domestic politicians or institutions will surely
seek to do something similar at the international level+18 Research on foreign aid,
which KMM discuss, for instance, confirms this intuition+19 Svensson demon-
strates that the expectation of aid inflows can be sufficient to fuel rent-seeking and
15+ Goldstein 1998+
16+ Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009, 11+
17+ Ibid+, 16+
18+ For convenience, we follow KMM in assuming that special interest politics are detrimental to
democracy+ However, there is abundant evidence to the contrary+ Special interest politics can improve
democratic decision making by reducing information asymmetry ~Austen-Smith 1993!, checking and
monitoring bureaucrats ~McCubbins and Schwartz 1984!, and balancing “bad” minority interests ~Becker
1983!+
19+ Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009, 14–15+
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deter governments from investing in public goods+20 Alesina and Weder show that
foreign aid tends to flow to corrupt governments, and that multilateral allocation
is not systematically different from bilateral allocation when it comes to favoring
corrupt governments+21 There is no evidence that multilateral allocation of aid is
more beneficial or less politicized than bilateral allocation+22
Research on International Monetary Fund ~IMF! policies and conditionality also
supports the view that increasing the power of MLOs tends to favor established
interests+ Broz has shown that U+S+ legislators’ votes on the IMF financial bailout
were heavily influenced by political action committee ~PAC! contributions from
private financial institutions+23 Gould has demonstrated that private financiers of
IMF loans to developing countries influence the terms of conditionality agree-
ments+24 Stone reports that U+S+ efforts to constrain IMF conditionality are prev-
alent especially among vulnerable developing countries+25 These studies suggest
that MLOs could expand, rather than reduce the power of special interests+
One area in which MLOs and domestic politics could differ is in the role of
money+ Domestic special interests typically make political donations to legislators
and political parties in the expectation of some quid quo pro+26 This is the very
kind of influence peddling that many democracy advocates wish to control+ In con-
trast, MLOs offer no formal channel through which special interests can legally
influence decision making+ Yet, the fact that officials of MLOs do not formally
run for office does not prevent money from entering politics+
A number of scholars have examined foreign aid as a means of “buying” votes
in the United Nations27 and at the International Whaling Commission+28 In addi-
tion to these overt channels in which member states use money to influence MLO
decisions, bribery and corruption are endemic to bureaucracies+ Scandal involving
UN officials supervising the Iraqi Oil-for-Food Program illustrates the risks of giv-
ing MLOs control over lucrative issues or valuable resources+
If money also influences politics at MLOs, then how should this process be
regulated to achieve improved citizen welfare and protection of minority rights?
In democratic politics, governments can regulate political donations and elections
can discipline dishonest politicians or officials+ Regulation of MLOs is much harder
as issue-linkages are prevalent across institutions with overlapping memberships
and jurisdictions, such as foreign aid and UN voting+ The majority of MLOs also
20+ Svensson 2000+
21+ Alesina and Weder 2002+
22+ This does not contradict the result in Milner 2006—which KMM discuss extensively—that pub-
lic skepticism about aid shifts allocation from bilateral to multilateral channels+ Milner’s thesis involves




26+ Grossman and Helpman 1994+
27+ See Kuziemko and Werker 2006; and Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008+
28+ Schaffer 2007+
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lack competitive elections to punish corrupt officials+ Regulation and discipline of
MLOs thus falls back on the same national governments supervised by MLOs+
KMM’s argument about preferences and the decision-making process of MLOs
versus local governments also poses a logical conundrum+ For interventions to be
effective, MLOs must achieve policy goals that domestic governments would not
have achieved autonomously+29 The policy preferences of domestic governments
and MLOs thus need to be in tension+ Yet, the greater this tension, the more domes-
tic interests benefit from resisting the efforts of the MLO+ One should expect to
see increased political activities by domestic interests to prevent, co-opt, or under-
mine MLO reforms as MLOs become more salient in domestic politics+
Efforts to undermine the welfare-improving policies of MLOs can take several
forms+ First, powerful states and well-resourced special interests can thwart or
reshape MLO initiatives+ This is possible either due to the formal structure of deci-
sion making at MLOs, which tends to protect status-quo powers ~for example, the
UN and IMF!, or because powerful actors are able to stall initiatives informally+
Second, MLOs with growing but finite enforcement powers are likely to impose
their rules where they are able+ For example, WTO treaty enforcement and IMF
financial oversight effectively favor wealthy countries over the poor+30
MLOs are born of politics+ Powerful interests create international institutions to
increase the welfare and stability of the founders+31 When founder states allow
MLOs to influence domestic politics, it is with the intent of disproportionately
affecting less powerful countries+ Selective intervention by MLOs creates an unlevel
playing field by undermining majoritarian interests in weaker states, while leaving
powerful special interests largely unaffected+
Up to this point, we have assumed that MLOs are well-intentioned+ Yet, MLOs
often overstep,32 make errors common to large bureaucracies,33 or even impose
harm+34 MLOs have inferior information about local conditions, compared with
local governments+ According to Keohane and Ostrom, “@g#overnment policies
that have ignored the local knowledge of participants or underestimated their abil-
ities to solve collective-action problems have done great damage+”35 What mech-
anisms will protect citizens from MLO expropriations or errors? KMM devote
almost no attention to the control or regulation of the powerful MLOs they
advocate+36
29+ See Dahl’s definition of power 1961+
30+ See Busch and Reinhardt 2002; and Satyanath 2006+
31+ Stone 2008+
32+ See Wade and Veneroso 1998; and Stiglitz 2002+
33+ Haas 1983+
34+ Barnett and Finnemore 2004+
35+ Keohane and Ostrom 1995, 21+
36+ KMM cite James Madison as support for their claim that bigger is better for democracy ~Ham-
ilton, Madison, and Jay 1961, 83!+ Madison was concerned about tyrannical permanent majorities that
he hoped would be checked by elections on two levels ~the very mechanism KMM discount!+ Modern
scholars use institutions as mechanisms to prevent cycling, creating permanent winners+
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The Governments and MLOs: General Welfare Versus
Distributional Effects
The normative rationale for international organizations is that they improve the
welfare of member states and citizens through the provision of social benefits that
are otherwise unobtainable due to various barriers to cooperation or collective
action+ MLOs protect the global commons, regulate pollution, and lower trade
restrictions+ While concerns persist, the appeal of MLOs as public goods provid-
ers is logically persuasive and normatively compelling+
The growing resources and power of MLOs mean that they have more oppor-
tunities to redistribute wealth at both the domestic and international level+37 KMM
focus on the public goods functions of MLOs, not on their distributional effects+
This imbalance strikes us as strange, again, precisely because KMM’s argument
hinges on the ability of MLOs to assign domestic winners and losers+ Although
KMM accept that MLOs will develop a distributional capacity as part of their
ability to influence domestic politics, they somehow assume this power as benign+38
The distributional power of MLOs poses a double-edged sword for reformers+
Once MLOs command the ability to redistribute within and between societies, inter-
ventions will create new winners and losers+ This is so even when MLOs have no
innate politicized incentives+39 As long as MLOs generate distributional conse-
quences, interested parties will seek to influence the decision making of MLOs+
To achieve the social benefits outlined by KMM, MLOs will have to resist not
only powerful vested interests that seek to block MLO reforms, but they must
also avoid capture by the newly emerging beneficiaries created by their own reform
efforts+40
One way of assisting MLOs in resisting such influences is to limit the scope of
their activities to areas where MLO regulations improve public goods provisions
without generating much in the way of distributional consequences+ However, this
means that the ability of MLOs to alter the domestic distribution of power needs
to remain fairly limited+ This in turn undermines KMM’s argument about the poten-
tial for MLOs to counter domestic special interests+ The capacity of MLOs to redis-
tribute wealth begs the question of how decision-making procedures at MLOs and
domestic governments affect redistribution+ In democracies, one of the major con-
straints on redistribution is the vote mechanism+41 Redistribution by MLOs can
also be regulated through representatives in the governing bodies of the organiza-
tion+ However, these MLO representatives are typically appointed by the same
officials and governments that MLOs are supposed to regulate and reform+ The
mechanism of “sanction at the ballot box” thus works at cross-purposes to KMM’s
37+ Goldstein and Martin 2000+
38+ For an objection, see Oatley and Nabors 1998 on the Basle Accord+
39+ Barro and Gordon 1983+
40+ Hellman 1998+
41+ Meltzer and Richard 1981+
Multilateralism and Democracy: Dissent 595
objectives+ If instead MLOs are autonomous from domestic citizens and policy-
makers, then MLOs are not accountable, and MLOs themselves are undemocratic+
Misuse of Empirical Cases
KMM’s use of empirical examples also poses concerns+ KMM offer two cases
intended to illustrate their claim that multilateralism can empower weak and dif-
fused interests: the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act ~RTAA! of 1934, which aided
consumers by lowering tariffs, and a WTO ruling requiring European countries to
compensate exporters when they restrict imports of genetically modified agricul-
tural products, which, KMM claim, gave consumers greater access to cheaper food+
Use of the RTAA case is problematic for two reasons:
1+ The RTAA was a domestic law that allowed U+S+ presidents to sign bilateral
trade agreements+ Thus, it did not originate as a multilateral endeavor+
2+ Scholarly convention is that the RTAA empowered exporters and organized
interests who stood to benefit from free trade+ Although the liberalization
achieved under the RTAA subsequently benefited consumers, the evidence is
clear that RTAA reform was intended to empower free-trade–oriented orga-
nized interests+42
Similarly, the WTO ruling can be seen as a triumph of well-resourced U+S+ agri-
cultural producers who export commodities with potential health risks at the expense
of consumer welfare+ These examples suggest that MLOs may help diffused inter-
ests, but only as a by-product of intended assistance to powerful interests+
Rather than making democracy more “democratic,” MLOs provide resources
and opportunities to fuel the kind of special interest politics KMM clearly oppose+
At least in this instance, the conventional wisdom appears fairly wise; MLOs can
accomplish many admirable objectives, but they are bound to weaken, rather than
augment, domestic democracy+
In concluding, we suggest promising venues for future research+ First, scholars
should focus on how domestic politics and institutions “filter” the distributional
effects of policies adopted by multilateral organizations+ This “filtering” can occur
in ways that mobilize organized interests or diffused interests via different elec-
toral systems, or, by empowering economic winners or losers via partisanship in
the government+43 Identifying domestic conditions under which multilateral inter-
ventions mobilize some groups over others will help to clarify our debate+ Sec-
ond, scholars should go beyond testing the effect of multilateralism on general
welfare outcomes and look at its effect on political processes and decision-making
procedures more directly+ This line of inquiry allows researchers to identify con-
42+ See Haggard 1988; and Gilligan 1997+
43+ Naoi 2009+
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ditions under which multilateralism leads to more insulation or capture of domes-
tic governments by special interests+
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